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ALLEVIATING PROBLEMS UNDER THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 THROUGH
TREASURY REGULATIONS
RICHARD A. MULLENS
Silverstein and Mullens, Washington, D. C.
Although there may be differing opinions as to the merits of the
many provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there is general agree-
ment in both Congress and the Administration that the Act is one of
the most complicated and innovative tax statutes ever passed.
When one stops to consider that the Tax Reform Act, signed into
law by President Nixon on December 30, 1969, represents a compro-
mise or meshing of the provisions as passed by the House and the
Senate and that each of those versions represented the views and inter-
actions of many Congressmen and Senators and' when one stops to
consider that this is the first major tax legislation in recent years where
the Administration was controlled by one party and Congress was
controlled by the other party, it is easy to understand why such a law
would have many ambiguities and uncertainties not to mention some
outright inconsistencies which must be resolved if the Act is to be
fairly administered.
Treasury regulations have provided the time honored route to the
solution of problems of interpretation of tax statutes. In discussing my
subject, I would first like to give you some backkground into the
authority or weight to be accorded Treasury regulations, then describe
the new program in Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service for
issuing regulations under the Tax Reform Act. After that, we will
go into a number of the problem areas which the new regulations will
have to deal with.
Authority to Issue Tax Regulations
Since 1886, the Secretary of Treasury has had delegated to him
broad ruling making powers to carry out the functions of his office.
Even absent such delegation, it seems clear under the Constitution,
which requires the Executive Department to enforce and administer
laws passed by Congress, that the Secretary had not only the power
but the duty to promulgate regulations under the income tax laws.
In addition to the broad delegation of powers which I have just
mentioned, there is specific authority in the Internal Revenue Code
authorizing and requiring tax regulations. Section 7805(a) of the
Code provides that:
".. . the Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of this tide."
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We do not have to stop with section 7805(a). There are many
places in the Tax Reform Act where the "Secretary or his delegate"
is directed or authorized to prescribe regulations. During the drafting
of regulations under the 1954 Code, Laurens Williams, who was then
Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury and Head of the Legal Advisory
Staff, stated that there were 1,338 places in the 1954 Code where the
Secretary or his delegate was directed or authorized to issue regula-
tions. This amounted to a delegation in almost two out of every three
sections or subsections in the 1954 Code. While I have not counted
the specific delegations in the Tax Reform Act, I would guess that
the ratio of delegations to sections and subsections is at least as
high as it was for the 1954 Code.
Shifting now from the authority to issue Treasury regulations to
the weight to be given them, we find that while Courts have the power
to review Treasury regulations and to disregard them if the Court
determines they are unreasonable, unwarranted, or arbitrary, the Courts
generally follow the rule that Treasury regulations are entitled to
great weight. The force and effect or weight will vary according to
the type of regulations. In the tax area, regulations can be divided
into three categories:
1. Substantive or legislative regulations. An example of this is
in section 385, added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act. That
section authorizes the "Secretary or his delegate" to "prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether
an interest in a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title
as stock or indebtedness." We will come back to this section later
on.
2. Interpretative regulations. These regulations state the position
of the Government and control the position of the Internal Revenue
Service on every issue they resolve until they are changed or modi-
fied by Court action or by subsequent amendments to the regula-
tions.
3. Procedural regulations-which deal with the administration of
the tax laws.
Of the three types of regulations, most controversies between tax-
payers and the government are likely to develop in the interpretative
regulations. This is particularly true with the regulations program
under a law as complicated and as far reaching as the Tax Reform Act.
The Treasury and the Internal Revenue recognized, even before the
Reform Act became law, the massive program that would be required
to issue regulations in an orderly fashion.
They have moved quickly to muster the personnel and develop a
program and procedures for what surely is the most difficult regula-
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tions project ever faced by the Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service.
As you know, the usual procedure for issuing regulations involves
publication of -proposed regulations in the Federal Register in the
form of a notice of proposed rule making.
The Administrative Procedure Act passed in 1946 and since codified
in Title 5 of the United States Code is applicable to the Treasury De-
partment. It requires, among other things, that notice of proposed
rule making be published in the Federal Register and that the issuing
agency give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation. The Administra-
tive Procedure Act exempts from the notice requirement interpretative
rules and circumstances where the agency finds that notice and public
procedure thereon are impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.
Although it appears that interpretative regulations could be issued
without notice and opportunity for the public to be heard, I know of
no instance where interpretative income tax regulations which affect
the rights of taxpayers have been issued without notice and opportunity
to submit views. I am not counting temporary regulations which have
been issued from time to time without prior notice where time did
not permit notice. For example, temporary regulations were issued on
January 16, 1970, providing for an election permitted under section
83, which I will discuss later. That election had to be made by certain
taxpayers by January 29, 1970. Obviously, there was not sufficient
time between the time the 1969 Act became law on December 30, 1969,
and the last day for making the election, January 29, 1970 to go through
the usual notice procedure.
I might point out here that it has always been my experience both
in and out of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service that those
agencies want and encourage constructive suggestions and comments
on proposed regulations or, for that matter, even on regulations after
they have become final. This is especially true at the present time. I
heard Commissioner Thrower emphasize this when he addressed a
meeting of tax people last March in Washington and several other
officials working on the Regulations program have repeated it.
As part of the regulations program under the 1969 Act, a Policy
Committee composed of the Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Mr.
Cohen), the Commissioner (Mr. Thrower), the Chief Counsel (Mr.
Worthy) and the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) (Mr. Swartz)
was formed last January.
The Policy Committee meets regularly to consider and determine
questions of policy raised during the drafting of proposed regulations.
The idea is to give the drafting level technician guidance during all
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stages of the drafting process. In this way the draftsman will not
have to waste time in redrafting a regulation after a policy decision
used by him is later reversed.
In addition to its other responsibilities, the Policy Committee estab-
lished a priority classification for the various regulations projects and
set target dates for each project. There are 178 separate regulation
projects under the 1969 Act. Neither the priority classification nor
the target dates have been made public. The Committee also decided
that the regulations program would not attempt to solve all conceivable
problems.
As I mentioned before, the Administrative Procedure Act requires
that notice of proposed rule making be accompanied with an oppor-
tunity for interested persons to submit their views, with or without
oral presentation. Generally, whenever regulations of an extensive
nature are proposed, a public hearing is held. In the past, anyone
who requested an opportunity to speak was allowed to do so. Many
presentations consisted of speakers reading long, highly technical, and
I might add, boring comments on the regulations.
On October 23, 1970, the Internal Revenue Service had published
in the Federal Register an amendment to its procedural rules which
added ground rules for the conduct of the public hearings on notices
of proposed rule making.
The new hearing rules are much like those under which the House
Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee have been
operating for the past few years. Those persons desiring to testify at
the public hearing will be required to submit a written statement at a
specified time in advance of the date of the hearing. Such persons
will also have to submit a written digest, outline or list of issues.
Instead of reading written statements at the time of the hearing, wit-
nesses are asked to limit their discussion to matters contained in the
written statement and to be prepared to answer questions from the
Treasury and Internal Revenue Service people at the hearing.
The first public hearing under the new rules was held on October
26, 1970. Several others have been held since and more are scheduled
in the near future.
Another change over past practices with respect to the public hear-
ings is that some or all of the members of the Policy Committee have
been present at the hearings and have taken an active part in the dis-
cussion of issues and problems.
Section 1348-The fifty percent maximum rate on earned income
A key provision of the 1969 Act is the maximum tax rate on earned
income of sixty percent in 1971 and fifty percent for 1972 and there-
after. The statute-section 1348-has a definition of "earned income"
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.Which specifically excludes "any deferred compensation within the
meaning of section 404." The statute also excludes lump sum distri-
butions from a qualified pension or profit sharing plan which receive
capital gain treatment.
If the regulations under this provision are to provide full guidance,
they must interpret what is meant by "deferred compensation within
the meaning of section 404" in many areas where the statute is silent.
For example, since the statute specifically excludes from "earned in-
come" lump sum distributions which receive capital gain treatment,
what should happen to ordinary income distributions from a qualified
pension or profit sharing plan? There is also the question as to
whether payments under unfunded deferred compensation plans should
be characterized as deferred compensation or as "earned income" for
purposes of section 1348. Mr. John S. Nolan, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, in a speech delivered in October,
1970, indicated that the Treasury Department had reached a tentative
decision to treat ordinary income distributions from qualified pension
or profit sharing plans as "earned income." He also indicated that
unfunded deferred compensation plans probably would not qualify
as "earned income."
It is interesting to note that the Tax Section of the New York State
Bar Association, in a very comprehensive report on employee benefits
under the 1969 Act, has recommended that periodic distributions from
qualified pension, profit-sharing and annuity plans and payments under
section 403(b) annuities from charitable organizations not be con-
sidered as "earned income" except to the extent that payment is made
in the year in which the right to such payment was vested and in the
following year.
The legislative history of section 1348 is not particularly helpful in
providing answers for the regulations. The House version of the 1969
,Act simply excluded "any deferred compensation payment' .without
further explanation, The phrase "within the meaning of section. 404"
was added by the Conference Committee on the bill, presumably in
response, to some criticisms filed on the. House version which pointed
out the lack of specific language on the meaning of "any deferred
compensation." The addition of the words "within the meaning.of
section 404" unfortunately still leaves some unanswered questions.
Section. 404 does not .contain a definuition of the term "deferred com-
pensation" and it contains no references to employee stock options.,
either statutory or nonstatutor, .
The consensus from those who have been willing to state a posi-
tion on income from the. disposition of. sock acquired under a non-
statutory stock option is that such income should .qualify as .earned
incbme.% Mr. Nolan poirted: ou -th.at *hil .it wa s argu b tii he
baigain elemfi&it'.in A inqualified stock- option was earned'at a prior
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time, the rule in section 1.421-6 of the Regulations, that the income is
not ordinarily deemed to arise until the option is exercised, appears
to be controlling and would remove such options from classification
as deferred compensation. The New York Bar Association takes the
same view on nonqualified or nonstatutory options and even goes be-
yond Mr. Nolan's statements by asserting that income from the dis-
position of stock acquired under a statutory stock option should also
not be considered "deferred compensation within the meaning of sec-
tion 404."
With respect to the treatment of income from nonstatutory options,
if, as it appears, the regulations will characterize that income as
"earned income," such options may become a popular device to reward
key employees since the employer gets an ordinary deduction from
such an option. As you know, there is no deduction to the employer
in the case of qualified options unless the recipient makes a dis-
qualifying disposition and becomes subject to ordinary income tax. It
is the amounts taxed as ordinary income on certain dispositions of
stock acquired under a qualified or statutory plan which may be
treated as "earned income" instead of "deferred compensation" in the
regulations.
The earned income rate limitation has another problem area for the
regulations. The amount of earned income subject to the limitation
must be reduced if the tax preference items exceed $30,000. The
reduction is based on the greater of the current year's preferences or
the average preferences for the current and four preceding years. It is
obvious that if the reduction is applied to 1971, the first year when
the rate limitation is applicable, the four preceding years would in-
clude some years prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act.
Since there were no tax preference items in years before the Tax
Reform Act, it seems strange that section 1348 would require tax
preference items to be determined for years when there were no such
items. This anomaly is an example of what can happen when tax
statutes are drafted hurriedly and not subjected to public comment.
That particular language in section 1348 was not in either the House
or the Senate version of the Reform Act. It was inserted in con-
ference.
Mr. Nolan has suggested that the regulations will provide averaging
back only to 1970. In other words, in 1971 the tax preference items
for 1970 and 1971 will be averaged. In 1972, 1970, 1971 and 1972
would be averaged-and so on until the full five-year period is reached.
Section 83-Restricted Property Rules
Section 83 of the Code is new. It was added by the 1969 Act to
alter the tax treatment of deferred compensation arrangements known
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as restricted stock plans. Under Treasury Regulations in effect at the
time of the 1969 Act, no tax was imposed at the time the employee
received the restricted stock. Tax was deferred until the time the
restrictions lapsed and then only the value of the stock when it was
transferred to the employee was treated as compensation, provided the
stock had increased in value. If the stock had decreased in value
between the time it was transferred and the time when the restrictions
lapsed, only the lower value was treated as compensation.
Section 83 eliminates the "heads I win-tails you lose" concept in
the Regulations and provides that the fair market value of the property
in excess of any amount paid for it by the recipient is included in the
employee's income at the first time the recipient's rights in the property
are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
whichever occurs earlier. The statute also permits an employee to
make an election to take restricted property into income in the year
received even though he receives it subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture and his interest is not transferable.
Section 83 was made applicable, generally, to property transferred
after June 30, 1969, and the election had to be made in accordance
with rules prescribed by Treasury within 30 days after the transfer
or after enactment of the Tax Reform Act, whichever was later.
It was the election provisions of section 83 which produced the
first regulations under the 1969 Act. On January 16, 1970, slightly
more than two weeks after the 1969 Act became law, temporary regu-
lations were issued to provide for the election under section 83. The
temporary regulations will eventually be superseded by final regula-
tions but, as of now, they are still in full force and effect.
The final regulations under section 83 will also have to deal with
the question of what is meant by the statutory term "performance of
substantial services."
Section 83 specifically provides that the rights of an employee will
be considered as subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture (and hence,
eligible for tax deferral) if the employee's rights to full enjoyment of
the property are conditioned upon the future performance of sub-
stantial services.
There is no hint in either the statute or the Committee Reports as to
what is to be considered performance of substantial services. Whether
the test should be based on the amount of time or the value of services,
or both, are tough questions. A covenant not to compete would
usually not constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture since it is wholly
within the employee's control. However, in special cases, such a
covenant could constitute a substantial risk if it were applicable to a
person well below retirement age.
Section 83 introduces another question which the Regulations must
answer. Will income taxed under this section qualify for the earned
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income rate limitation in section 1348? It would seem so and Mr.
Nolan indicates that the Regulation will so provide.
Section 385-Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations
As Stock or Indebtedness
Section 385 is a good example of how Congress, from time to time,
dumps a tough problem or -a controversial tax area into the laps of
the tax administrators.
This section authorizes the Secretary or his delegate "to prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine
whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated***as stock or in-
debtedness."
The section then goes on to state that the regulations shall set forth
factors which are to be taken into account in determinig whether a
debtor-creditor relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder rela-
tionship exists and lists five factors which may be taken into account.
The legislative history of section 385 provides little other help. The
section first appeared in the Senate version of the 69 Act. The Senate
Finance Committee report discusses section 385 and section 279, re-
lating to the disallowance of corporate interest on certain acquisition
indebtedness, under one heading. It has this to say about section 385:
"In view of the uncertainties and difficulties which the distinction
between debt and equity has produced in numerous situations, the
committee further believes that it would be desirable to provide
rules for distinguishing debt from equity in the variety of contexts
in which this problem can arise. The differing circumstances which
characterize these situations, however, would make it difficult for
the committee to provide comprehensive and specific statutory rules
of universal and equal applicability. In view of this, the committee
believes it is appropriate to specifically authorize the Secretary of
Treasury to prescribe the appropriate rules for distinguishing debt
from equity in these different situations."
Several interesting problems are presented by the buck-passing in
section. 385. For one thing, although section 385 is new, it involves
the problem of distinguishing between debt and equity-a problem
which has been with us about as long as the income ix law itself. Will
the regulations under section 385 be entitled to Wight 'as legislative
regulations in. the nature 6f law? What will their effective date' be
What .happens if the Treasury takes a long time to isstie these regu-
!ations.
Those of us outside the Government do- not know what priority )Ias
been assignecd t6 the- regttlations utnder, seCtibri. 38.: I.would sssikne,
however; that they 'have' a vety" lo) priotitY; iiftb-':there does' not
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appear to be an easy solution to a problem that has been around such
a long time.
One factor specified in the statute which will undoubtedly be diffi-
cult to weigh is the factor of convertibility into stock of the corpora-
tion. I am sure the Service would welcome some good ideas about
handling that factor.
Section 279-Interest on Indebtedness Incurred by Corporation to
Acquire Stock or Assets of Another Corporation
This is a new section which was proposed in the House version of
the 1969 Act, modified somewhat in the Senate version and modified
further by the Conference Committee. There are fairly extensive com-
mittee reports to help chart the way through the statutory language.
Section 279 limits the deduction by a corporation of interest on
certain bonds and debentures which are issued as consideration for
acquisitions of stock or other assets of another corporation. The sec-
tion is designed to deter the conglomerate merger, which in the past
had been engineered largely by convertible debt obligations.
Several new terms are introduced in this section. For example, "cor-
porate acquisition indebtedness" triggers the interest limitation pro-
visions of section 279. The statute contains a detailed definition of
what constitutes "corporate acquisition indebtedness," including a con-
vertibility test and a ratio of debt-to-equity or earnings test. The
drafting of regulations for these provisions does not appear to be any
more difficult than other areas except for one aspect. Certain of the
tests in section 279 must be applied to affiliated groups on a consol-
idated basis even if separate returns are filed. The Secretary or his
delegate is authorized in section 279(g) to prescribe regulations which
will determine how these tests are to be computed on a consolidated
basis. I do not envy those assigned to draft these regulations.
Section 305-Distributions of Stock and Stock Rights
The 1969 Act made some significant changes or amendments to
section 305, dealing with distributions of stock and stock rights.
Formerly that section provided that a shareholder was not taxed on
a dividend paid in stock or rights to acquire such stock unless:
1. The stock dividends were paid in discharge of certain divi-
dends on preferred stock, or
2. A shareholder could elect to receive his dividend in cash
instead of stock.
That rule was enacted as part of the 1954 Code and replaced what
had developed as a court made "proportionate interest test." Those
decisions had held that a stock dividend was taxable if it increased the
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shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. This was a
difficult test to apply and was dropped at the time of the 1954 Code
for the test in section 305.
However, under that test, corporations were able to develop methods
or plans which, in effect, gave stockholders an indirect choice between
receiving cash or increasing their proportionate interests in the corpora-
tion, often without any actual distribution of stock to the stockholders
who got the increase in proportionate interests.
As amended by the 1969 Act, section 305 includes a "proportionate
interest test" in subsection (b) and in subsection (c). The amend-
ments are drafted in rather general terms no doubt to cover the various
ingenious ways corporations have attempted to achieve the effect of
a cash dividend to some shareholders and a corresponding increase in
the proportionate interest of other shareholders.
On May 1, 1970, a Temporary Regulation under section 305 was
issued to clarify the tax status of a dividend issued entirely in
stock except that cash was to be distributed in lieu of fractional
shares in order to save the issuing corporation the expense and in-
convenience of issuing fractional shares. The Temporary Regula-
tion held that the stock dividend paid under those circumstances
was not taxable. Temporary Regulations were used in this instance,
I believe, because time was a factor and because hardly any taxpayer
except maybe a public interest organization would object to or be
hurt by the regulation.
Another rule in new section 305 provides that a distribution of
stock or rights will be taxable if it is one of a series of distributions
which has the result of the receipt of cash by some shareholders and an
increase in the proportionate interests of the other shareholders in the
corporation. It will be difficult in the regulations to describe what
will and what will not be deemed a series of distributions. One of the
problems with specificity in the regulations in an area such as this is
that it provides a road map or blue print for just how far a corpora-
tion can go in avoiding the impact of the new law.
A further new provision in section 305 taxes a shareholder receiving
a distribution from a corporation of convertible preferred stock on his
common stock on the value of the stock received, unless he proves
to the Internal Revenue Service that the distribution will not result
in a disproportionate distribution. The regulations under this pro-
vision will no doubt establish some general guides which can be used
to satisfy this requirement. Martin Worthy, Chief Counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service, indicated in a talk before the Tax Execu-
tives Institute in September that:
"The major consideration which would seem to influence this
determination is whether there is a basis for predicting at what
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time and to what extent the stock will in fact be converted. The
factors which we will probably require be taken into account in-
clude the period of time in which the conversion right must be
exercised, the conversion price, the dividend rate, the redemption
provisions, and the marketability of the convertible stock. If, after
considering these factors, it is reasonable to anticipate that some
shareholders will exercise their conversion rights and some will not,
then the distribution will be subject to tax as a dividend. If, how-
ever, the conversion right is exercisable over a period of time, such
as ten years, and the dividend rate is consistent with market condi-
tions, there is then no basis for predicting at what time and to what
extent the stock will be converted, and under this principle the dis-
tribution would not run afoul of the new provision."
There will be some cases under section 305 where a change in the
conversion ratio will result in an increase in the proportionate interest
of some shareholders and consequently a tax even though no actual
distribution of stock has been made. This will involve a problem of
valuation which the regulations may or may not attempt to solve.
In summary, section 305 under the 1969 Act is a good example of
a complex provision designed to discourage the ever present efforts
of tax planners to come up with plans which afford tax savings. The
statutory language is in rather general terms, leaving the details and
the interpretations to be covered in regulations.
Private Foundations
In a normal legislative year, the statutory provisions in the Tax
Reform Act dealing with exempt organizations by themselves would
have given the tax administrators plenty to work on. 1969 definitely
was not a normal tax legislative year. The private foundation provi-
sions were just a part, although a very large part, of the problems and
headaches left to the administrators to solve.
Under the Act, the term "private foundation" was introduced to
provide a touchstone for a number of new restrictions and excise
taxes on those exempt organizations which fell within the definition
of "private foundation."
The permissible activities of "private foundations" are tightened
to prevent self dealing between the foundations and their substantial
contributors, to require the distribution of income for charitable pur-
poses, to limit their holdings of private business, to give assurance that
their activities are properly restricted as provided by the exemption
provisions of the tax laws, and to provide certainty that investments
of these organizations are not jeopardized by financial speculation.
The income tax provisions applicable to private foundations were
added to the Code as Part II of Subchapter F. Subchapter F covers
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exempt organizations. Part II is headed "Private Foundations" and
contains three new sections, including section 509 which defines the
term "private foundation". John Nolan pointed to some language in
section 509 which illustrates some of the difficulty of implementing
the 1969 Act.
One part of section 509(a) provides:
"For purposes of paragraph (3), an organization described in
paragraph (2) shall be deemed to include an organization described
in section 501(c) (4) (5), or (6) which would be described in para-
graph (2) if it were an organization described in section 501(c) (3)."
A little over a month after Mr. Nolan pointed out that statutory
language, proposed regulations were published covering that language
along with the other provisions in section 509. The proposed regula-
tions do make sense out of the statutory language, at least I felt they
did when I read them. I am not sure you would feel that way on
hearing the proposed regulations, but I would like to find out. Here
is what the proposed regulations say:
"For purposes of section 509 (a)(3), an organization which is
operated in conjunction with an organization described in section
501(c) (4) (5), or (6) (such as a social welfare organization, labor
or agricultural organization, business league, or real estate board)
shall, if it otherwise meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3),
be considered an organization described in section. 509(a) (3) if such
section 501(c)(4)(5), or (6) organization would be described in
section 509(a) (2) if it were an organization described in section
501(c) (3). The section 501(c) (4) (5), or (6) organization, which
the section 509 (a) (3) organization is operating in conjunction with,
must therefore meet the tests of a publicly supported organization
set forth in section 509 (a) (2). For example, X medical association,
described in section 501(c) (6), is supported almost entirely by
membership dues of $100 per member. X organized and operated
an endowment fund for the sole purpose of furthering medical
education. The fund is an organization described in section 501(c)
(3). Since the medical association is supported almost entirely by
membership dues of $100 per member, it would be a publicly sup-
ported organization described in section 509(a)(2) if it were de-
scribed in section 501(c)(3) rather than section 501(c)(6). Ac-
cordingly, if the fund otherwise meets the requirements of section
509(a) (3), it will be considered an organization described in sec-
tion 509 (a) (3)."
All told, the proposed regulations under section 509 take up 13%
pages of fine print in the Federal Register of November 20, 1970.
Interested persons have 30 days from that date to submit comments
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and suggestions in writing. A public hearing will undoubtedly be
held at a later date.
The proposed regulations contain many helpful examples and much
detail that resolve problems with the statutory language. I would say,
however, that there will still be difficulty in distinguishing between
"grants", on the one hand, and contract payments or payments for
services on the other hand. This distinction is vital in applying the
one-third support test in section 509(a) (2).
Paragraph (g) of the proposed regulations is entitled "Grants dis-
tinguished from gross receipts". Subparagraph (1) of paragraph (g)
points out that grants are often made to a foundation subject to terms
and conditions imposed by the grantor to insure that the grantee's
programs or activities are conducted in a manner compatible with
the grantor's own programs and policies and beneficial to the public.
The grantee may also perform a service or produce a work product
which incidently benefits the grantor. This makes it difficult to dis-
tinguish amounts received as "grants" for the carrying on of exempt
activities (which is the good or desirable category) from amounts
received as gross receipts from the carrying on of exempt activities.
Subparagraph (2) of the proposed regulations under section 509
then sets out some distinguishing factors, but the language seems to
make the distinction hinge on the primary purpose of the grant or
payment. If it is primarily to confer a direct benefit upon the general
public, it will be deemed a grant. If it is primarily to serve the needs
of the payor, it will be deemed "gross receipts from".
Here again, I am sure the Internal Revenue Service would like to hear
from anyone who can draw a more specific yet acceptable line.
The excise taxes imposed on private foundations are in a new Chap-
ter 42 added to the Internal Revenue Code. These include a tax on
investment income, self-dealing, a failure to distribute income, excess
business holdings and others.
Regulations have not yet been issued under Chapter 42. One of the
problem areas will be providing clear rules to distinguish an "operat-
ing foundation", which gets special status, from a private foundation
which does not qualify as "operating".
The Code provides generally that a foundation is in the "operating"
category if its income and assets are devoted "directly" to the "active
conduct" of its charitable or educational activities.
Obviously there are degrees of activity and the regulations may well
have to simply spell out the extremes on either end and leave the
actual line between the two rather hazy.

